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ABSTRACT
This article examines key debates on the legal definition of slavery from the perspective
of survivors. This group has previously not been included in the debates on slavery
definitions. By drawing upon new interviews we have conducted with survivors and an
analysis of hundreds of historical and contemporary slave narratives, the article resolves
this critical oversight. Our analysis maps survivors’ ideas onto existing definitions, andwe
argue that a survivor-informed definition can expand our understanding of the nature of
slavery and, therefore, shape antislavery policies and practice.
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1. INTRODUCTION
‘Give us the freedom intended for us .... We claim ... full freedom ... We are not free ...’
—Frederick Douglass, 1872
Although slavery and the slave trade are globally prohibited, an estimated 40.3
million people1 are enslaved today. As awareness of this phenomenon grew since its
emergence as a global issue in the late 1990s, the antislavery community—including
governments, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), businesses and courts—adopted the term ‘modern slavery’ to encompass
a host of practices, including trafficking in persons, sexual exploitation, forced labour,
bonded labour, domestic servitude, the worst forms of child labour, forced marriage
and organ harvesting. Today there remains considerable debate about the formal
parameters of slavery, as distinguished from lesser servitudes and ‘institutions and
practices similar to slavery’.2 Yet the major contributions to the debate exclude a key
set of people who have their own definitions: survivors of slavery. The legal parameters
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2 • Contemporary Survivors’ Definitions of Slavery
of slavery shape all areas of antislavery practice, from estimates of slavery prevalence to
decisions on resourcing for survivor recovery, but scholars and practitioners have not
integrated testimonies of lived experience into this important definitional debate.
In 2017, we conducted semi-structured interviews with survivors about their own
definitions of slavery and freedom. None of the participants were given existing sug-
gestions for legal definition prior to the interviews. Drawing on these interviews with
survivors and on a wider analysis of hundreds of historical and contemporary slave
narratives, we now bring survivors’ perspectives to bear on the definition of slavery.
These narrative accounts reveal nuanced concepts of control and freedom and add
layers to existing definitions. They also give us the capacity to make the application of
law a survivor-informed process. By applying a survivor lens to existing definitions—by
assessing the meaning of slavery and evaluating the nature of its control and possession
through survivors’ self-described experiences—we can refine an operational definition,
make empathy and justice a key part of our legal framework, respect survivors as
full participants in the antislavery fight and work with survivors to achieve what the
nineteenth-century abolitionist Frederick Douglass called a ‘full freedom’.
2. SLAVERY DEFINITIONS IN LAW
Clear legal distinctions between slavery, ‘practices similar to slavery’ and other forms
of exploitative treatment allow a preservation of slavery’s jus cogens nature, a reflection
of harm in sentencing and an assessment of government antislavery efficacy. Reflecting
the importance of these parameters, the language of relevant legal provisions is often
devised purposefully to either close the parameters of interpretation or to create a
flexibility within frameworks that reflects the purpose of the legal instrument and
allows for interpretation in line with shifting social mores. But even the most carefully
constructed legal provision is often unable to capture with precision the parameters of
circumstances to which it might apply. Courts must make judgments on the meaning
and purpose of definition, and on the particular facts of each case, and in terms of
the definition of slavery, do so in the absence of consensus over the benchmarks
of ‘ownership’. Meanwhile, the media and antislavery organisations rarely make these
legal distinctions when trying to raise awareness of slavery—instead employing the
word ‘slavery’ for its advocacy value and reinforcing a traditional separation between
social and legal definitions.
At the heart of all ongoing definitional debates is the legal definition of slavery
in the 1926 Slavery Convention: ‘Slavery is the status or condition of a person over
whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’.3
Where legal ownership of another human being is now prohibited, this is now
interpreted tomean de facto ownership. However, without the mark of legal ownership,
factual ownership is difficult to determine. The debate over how best to apply the
1926 definition in the twenty-first century moved forward in 2008 with the high-
profile case of Tang (2008).4 Here, the High Court of Australia confirmed that
the definition of slavery ‘turns upon the exercise of power over a person . . . the exercise
3 Article 1 League of Nations, Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, 25 September 1926, 60
LNTS 253; signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926; entered into force on 9March 1927.
4 The Queen v Tang [2008] HCA 39.
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of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership’.5 The Court thenmade a
distinction between slavery and harsh and exploitative treatment, highlighting the need
to determine ‘the nature and extent of the powers exercised’.6 This suggested that any
evaluationofparticular circumstances should involve ananalysis of the substance aswell
as the form of the relationship, and the Court outlined ways tomeasure both substance
and form when examining a relationship for indications of slavery: slavery, as opposed
to other exploitative treatment, is evidenced by ‘a capacity to deal with a complainant
as a commodity, an object of sale and purchase . . . to use the complainants and their
labour in a substantially unrestricted manner, the power to control and restrict their
movements and the power to use their serviceswithout commensurate compensation’.7
A broader approach was taken in 2010 when the European Court of Human Rights
addressed the definition of slavery in the case of Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia.8 Here,
the Court determined that human trafficking was based on slavery, the Court stating
that ‘trafficking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of exploitation, is based
on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership’.9 The Court went on
to conclude that it was ‘unnecessary to identify whether the treatment about which
the applicant complains constitutes “slavery”, “servitude” or “forced and compulsory
labour”. Instead, the Court concludes that trafficking itself, within the meaning of
Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol and Article 4(a) of the Anti-Trafficking Conven-
tion, falls within the scope of Article 4 of the Convention.’10 The Court’s judgment has
been criticised for expanding Article 4, the prohibition of slavery, servitude and forced
labour, beyond its textual parameters.11
Two years later, the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of
Slavery (2012) advanced the definitional debate further. The Guidelines take the 1926
definition of slavery as the exercise of ‘the powers attaching to the right of ownership’
and explain that ownership should be understood as constituting ‘control over a person
in such a way as to significantly deprive that person of his or her individual liberty, with
the intent of exploitation through the use, management, profit, transfer or disposal
of that person’.12 The Guidelines then equate control with possession.13 With this
definition, ‘institutions and practices similar to slavery’ can become slavery when they
include control extended over a person tantamount to possession: ‘such as a person
might control a thing . . . control [that] will significantly deprive that person of his or
her individual liberty for a period of time which is, for that person, indeterminate.’14
The Guidelines also identify examples of the powers attaching to ownership: ‘Such
5 Ibid. at para 25.
6 Ibid. at para 44.
7 Ibid. at paras 44, 50.
8 Application No 25965/04, Merits, 7 January 2010.
9 Ibid. at para 281.
10 Ibid. at para 282.
11 For a detailed analysis of the problems with the Court’s approach to the definition on trafficking and slavery,
see Allain, ‘Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia: The European Court of Human Rights and Trafficking as Slavery’
(2010) 10Human Rights Law Review 546.
12 Members of the Research Network on the Legal Parameters of Slavery, ‘2012 Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines
on the Legal Parameters of Slavery’, at Guideline 2, available at: law.qub.ac.uk [last accessed 11 September
2018].
13 Ibid. at Guideline 3.
14 Ibid.
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4 • Contemporary Survivors’ Definitions of Slavery
control may be physical, but physical constraints will not always be necessary to
the maintenance of effective control over a person. More abstract manifestations of
control of a person may be evident in attempts to withhold identity documents; or
to otherwise restrict free movement or access to state authorities or legal processes;
or equally in attempts to forge a new identity through compelling a new religion,
language, place of residence, or forcing marriage.’15 Some examples in the Guidelines
of the powers attaching to ownership include buying, selling, transferring and using a
person, managing and profiting from the use of a person, transferring a person to an
heir or successor and the disposal, mistreatment or neglect of a person.16
Following the publication of the Guidelines, scholars have used them and the 1926
Convention as a starting point for the on-going refinement and application of a slavery
definition. Allain and Hickey, two of the key legal scholars behind the development of
the Guidelines, went on to argue that control (tantamount to possession) is evidenced
through the buying and selling of individuals, managing and profiting from the use
of a person, the transfer of persons and the power to dispose of their property.17
This then provides for an application of the 1926 definition that connects historical
legal ownership with possession of property today. Allain and Hickey also provide
an example of a lesser servitude, where an individual’s labour is exploited or forced,
but an employer does not control other elements of life and so does not have control
amounting to possession.18
In our 2017 interview with Pranus, a 46-year-old Lithuanian man who came to
the UK to work, he outlined an experience that reinforces several of the legal debate’s
consensus points and the distinction between slavery and lesser servitude outlined by
Allain and Hickey. On his arrival in the UK, he was met by traffickers and forced into
severe labour exploitation in the agricultural sector. His traffickers exercised control
over his movements, accommodation and income. They subjected him to violence
and the threat of violence and retained a significant proportion of his pay. When
he protested, his traffickers denied him further work in order to force compliance.
However, the power exercised over Pranus was not absolute, nor was he treated—
in the words of the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines—as if he were ‘a thing’. He was
not controlled to the point of possession and his experience aligns with Allain and
Hickey’s example of lesser servitude. Although he relied on his exploiters to provide
him with work, accommodation and income, and experienced long working hours,
poor living conditions and controlling behaviour, he was ultimately free to leave. He
had freedom of movement—to go to the supermarket and other shops unattended—
and (with some difficulty) he was able to retain a bank account in his own name.19
After he and a co-worker were severely beaten for questioning their pay, he went to
the police. In our interview, Pranus did not associate his treatment with slavery. When
discussing the meaning of slavery, he spoke in the third person:
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. at Guideline 4.
17 Allain and Hickey, ‘Property and the Definition of Slavery’ (2012) 61 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 915 at 933-5.
18 Ibid. at 933.
19 Ibid.
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To hear about slavery in the 21st century, a person is a slave when that person is
under the control of other people, when a person is locked up, physically used
and when a person gets beaten up sometimes and is sleep deprived. I read such
stories in the papers sometimes. Worse situations, worse than mine, have
happened to people. There are a lot of examples. When people work for free and
others take their money. That’s what I think.20
Although for Pranus slavery is something that happens to others and in different
circumstances, his definition lays out criteria that are recognisable from the debates of
the past decade: control and domination, deprivation of liberty, violence and profiting
from the ‘use’ of a person without commensurate compensation.
Along with Allain and Hickey, another key voice in the definitional debate has
been the social scientist Kevin Bales. In 1999, Bales outlined slavery’s key dimensions
as violence or its threat, loss of control over one’s life, obligation to another, lack of
free movement and lack of payment. A working definition was people ‘held against
their will for purposes of exploitation’.21 More recently, after the development of the
Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines, Bales has expanded on his early definition to discuss
the mechanisms and outcomes of control: ‘the control of one person (the slave) by
another (the slaveholder or slaveholders). This control transfers agency, freedom of
movement, access to the body, and labour and its products and benefits, to the slave-
holder. The control is supported and exercised through violence and its threat. The
aim of this control is primarily economic exploitation, but may include sexual use or
psychological benefit.’ Bales added: ‘At its most fundamental, as a state of being, slavery
is about a radical diminution in the exercise of free will; it is a loss of personal liberty.’22
Finally, a fourth key voice in the definitional debate has been the sociologist
Orlando Patterson, who argues for a narrower approach. Joining other scholars to
debate the legal definition of slavery in the wake of the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines,
Patterson built upon his 1982 definition (the ‘permanent, violent domination of
natally alienated and generally dishonoured persons’) to define slavery as ‘the
violent, corporeal possession of socially isolated and parasitically degraded persons’.
This corporeal possession is based on the ‘exercise or threat of physical violence
characterised, first by the absolute power (in practice) of the master over his slave,
the latter becoming merely an extension of the will and household of the former, the
deracination and socio-cultural isolation of the slave (natal alienation) and the absolute
degradation of the attached to slave status—a lack of dignity and respect’.23 The criteria
of socio-cultural isolation and natal alienation provide a narrower interpretation of
‘possession’ than suggested by Allain, Hickey and Bales.
While these scholars differ, they do reach consensus on some fundamentals for
identifying slavery: the exercise of significant control by the slaveholder so as to hold
20 Pranus, as told to Andrea Nicholson, 20 January 2017 (on file with authors). Our thanks to Migrant Legal
Action for their assistance.
21 Bales,Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy (1999) at 19-20.
22 Bales, ‘Professor Kevin Bales’s Response to Professor Orlando Patterson’ in Allain, supra n 12 at 371.
23 Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (1982) at 13; Patterson, ‘Trafficking, Gender and
Slavery: Past and Present’ in Allain (ed.), The Legal Understanding of Slavery: From the Historical to the
Contemporary (2012) 329.
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6 • Contemporary Survivors’ Definitions of Slavery
power over the individual, the loss of personal liberty and the exploitation, use, transfer
or sale of another person. But even the points of consensus between Allain, Bales,
Hickey and Patterson have not produced an accepted working definition that reflects
slavery as a continuum. Lawyers, policy-makers and antislavery practitioners continue
to debate the factors that accurately indicate enslavement, how to distinguish between
practices and the requisite level of ownership. At the same time, scholarly attempts
to chart continuities of slavery have struggled to navigate the gaps between legal and
factual slavery. Legal slavery of the past may not have been what we would consider
de facto slavery today. We therefore also lack an accepted working definition that
acknowledges slavery’s historical continuities.
3. SLAVERY DEFINITIONS IN HISTORICAL SLAVE NARRATIVES
Testing these ideas of the past decade’s legal debate against survivors’ own ideas, we can
identify a survivor-centred definition in the narratives of ex-slaves, past and present.
For example, the leading African-American abolitionist and former slave Frederick
Douglass repeatedly offered a clear definition of slavery as ‘the granting of that power
by which one man exercises and enforces a right of property in the body and soul
of another.’24 This was his lecture circuit definition—a sentence near the beginning
of his public talks to anchor the speech’s antislavery arguments. But he also used
autobiographical narrative to add definitional layers that suggest how to recognise an
exercise of the ‘right of property’ in practice.
Key to Douglass’ definition was the denial of access to temporality—specifically
future time. His famous Narrative of 1845 describes slavery as a state where he could
‘lay out no plans for the future’ and had to achieve ‘complete thoughtlessness of the
future’.25 He returned to this theme of denied futurity in his second autobiography,My
Bondage andMy Freedom (1855), where he observes the denial of ‘progress’ to the slave,
who has no ‘future’:
The thought of only being a creature of the present and the past, troubled me,
and I longed to have a future—a future with hope in it. To be shut up entirely to
the past and present, is abhorrent to the human mind; it is to the soul—whose
life and happiness is unceasing progress—what the prison is to the body; a blight
and mildew, a hell of horrors.26
If slavery is a denial of temporal movement, it is also a denial of spatial movement.
Douglass explains thatwhile freemenmight ‘contemplate a life in the farwest, or in some
distant country’, the ‘slave is a fixture; he has no choice, no goal, no destination; but is
pegged down to a single spot, and must take root here, or nowhere’.27 As slaves have
no future in time, so they have no spatial destination. Instead, the slaveholder controls
all space through surveillance: ‘He was under every tree, behind every stump, in every
24 Douglass, ‘American Slavery, American Religion, and the Free Church of Scotland: An Address Delivered in
London, England, on May 22, 1846’ in Blassingame et al. (eds), The Frederick Douglass Papers: Series One–
Speeches, Debates, and Interviews Vol. 1 (1979) 269.
25 Douglass,Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave (1845) at 103.
26 Douglass,My Bondage and My Freedom. Part I. Life as a Slave. Part II. Life as a Freeman (1855) at 273.
27 Ibid. at 177, 176.
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Contemporary Survivors’ Definitions of Slavery • 7
bush, and at every window, on the plantation.’28 Exiting human time, the slave also
exits human space—he is ‘a man going into the tomb . . . buried out of sight’ in ‘a stone
prison’.29
Along with Douglass, the former slave Harriet Jacobs gave nineteenth-century abo-
litionism itsmost extensive survivor definition of slavery. Again, the definition revolved
around the slave’s lack of access to time and space. Her autobiography Incidents in the
Life of a Slave Girl (1861) has at its centre a tiny garret space in which the narrator
hides for seven years after escaping from her master. Jacobs makes the garret space a
symbol of the slave’s social space, describing it as ‘living grave’ and a ‘dismal hole’, and
slavery itself as being beyond ‘the pale of human beings’, with shadows that ‘are too
dense for light to penetrate’, a ‘cage of obscene birds’ and a ‘black pit’.30 Like Douglass,
Jacobs also defined slavery as a specific relationship with time as well as space. Part
of slavery’s imprisonment is a lackof access to the future. Slavesdonot ‘knowwhat a year
may bring forth’, just that anything might ‘at any moment be wrenched away’.31 Their
only certainty is that there is ‘no prospect of being able to lead a better life’.32 A state
of no-time as well as no-space, slavery combines the liminal times of dusk and dawn:
it means ‘the very dawn of life is darkened by these shadows’.33 The garret’s symbolic
space therefore embodies this disruption of time’s passage: ‘Morning came. I knew it
only by the noises I heard; for in my small den day and night were all the same.’34
Jacobs juxtaposes her wait in the garret spacewith descriptions of temporal suspension:
multiple moments when the ‘suspense was dreadful.’35
Douglass and Jacobs, authors of the two most celebrated nineteenth-century slave
narratives, offered a definition of slavery as the eternal present—a space of no-time.
Slavery is suspended time where the future is inaccessible, and human beings cannot
hope or plan because they cannot decide or act. And slavery’s no-time, without the
expectation of progress and change, is also a no-space: it is fixity, a site without destina-
tion. These definitions were important to how Douglass and other nineteenth-century
abolitionist leaders campaigned against slavery. For example, Douglass’ understanding
of American slavery as temporal and spatial fixity underpinned his support for the
radical abolitionist John Brown’s ‘Provisional Constitution’ and attempt to arm slaves
for a widespread uprising in 1859: his call for black men to enlist as soldiers during
the Civil War in 1863 and his demand that African-Americans receive voting rights
in the wake of Emancipation and slavery’s legal end, all accompanied by speeches and
writings that explained the importance of African Americans creating their own future
in these ways—via insurrection, participation in armed conflict and full citizenship.
An effective national post-emancipation plan would also have taken up the slavery
definitions of nineteenth-century slave narratives to shape a freedom around access to
future time and free space: land ownership for former slaves, not peonage; an expansion
of the educational reach of the Freedman’s Bureau; a government agency established to
28 Douglass, supra n 21 at 61.
29 Douglass, supra n 22 at 177, 301.
30 Jacobs, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (1861) at 58, 81, 223-4, 245, 289.
31 Ibid. at 93, 58.
32 Ibid. at 117.
33 Ibid. at 45.
34 Ibid. at 173.
35 Ibid. at 165.
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8 • Contemporary Survivors’ Definitions of Slavery
help former slaves after Emancipation; and the prevention of the new ‘Black Codes’,
laws passed by former slave-holding states after Emancipation to restrict the civil rights
and free movement of former slaves. In other words, as one country abolished slavery
by Douglass’ lecture circuit definition—removing the legal ‘power by which one man
exercises and enforces a right of property in the body and soul of another’—survivor
testimony could have helped to guide what Douglass was still demanding in 1872,
seven years after the end of the Civil War and of the country’s legal slavery. Surveying
conditions for former slaves and observing that ‘we are not free’, Douglass called again
for ‘full freedom’.36
4. SLAVERY DEFINITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SLAVE
NARRATIVES
Many contemporary slave narratives express the Douglass’ and Jacobs’ definition of
slavery as a futureless state. Telling their autobiographical accounts of enslavement
in its immediate aftermath, dozens of narratives explore the difficulty of projecting
forward after slavery—ofmovingpast the slave’s static self: ‘I don’t knowwhatmy future
will be . . .. When others discuss the future I run away . . .. My mind I feel is frozen’,
observes Sabitha-Jayanthi. Abirami notes:
I know I should think of living but there is a feeling that death is hanging over my
head . . .. Whatever I aspire for or need . . . I won’t get . . .. I don’t want to think
of my future. I don’t want to dream of anything. For anything at all, as I won’t get
anything . . .. How will my future be?37
But slavery as stasis is just one of the many nuanced understandings of slavery
laid out by contemporary narratives. Some of those understandings echo the ideas of
nineteenth-century antislavery: lack of futurity, but also Douglass’ idea that slavery
was being ‘deprived of myself—of my own body, soul, and spirit’,38 and Brown’s
definition of slavery as a war waged by slaveholders upon slaves.39 Other definitions
in contemporary narratives echo the ideas of the past decade’s legal debates, including
the ideas of Allain, Bales, Patterson and the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines. Based on
our interviews and our survey of historical and contemporary narratives, the experi-
ences of many contemporary survivors of slavery would fit within these definitional
consensus points of the past decade’s legal debates.
Many also meet Patterson’s narrower definition of socio-cultural isolation and
absolute degradation. In numerous narratives, individuals describe degradation to the
point of dehumanisation. They sleep on floors, in outbuildings or cattle pens or tied
outside on the ground. Many eat leftover food and only when it is available and receive
36 Douglass, ‘Give us the Freedom Intended for Us’ The New National Era, 5 December 1872.
37 Sabitha-Jayanthi (2002) and Abirami (2002), Contemporary Narratives Collection, The Antislavery Usable
Past, available at: antislavery.ac.uk/narratives [last accessed 8 September 2018].
38 Douglass, ‘I Am Here to Spread Light on American Slavery: An Address Delivered in Cork, Ireland on 14
October 1845’ in Blassingame et al., supra n 24 at 39-40.
39 See also Brown, ‘Whereas slavery, throughout its entire existence in the United States, is none other than a
most barbarous, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war of one portion of its citizens upon another portion’ in
‘Provisional Constitution and Ordinances for the people of the United States, May 8, 1858’ in Stauffer and
Trodd (eds), The Tribunal: Responses to John Brown and the Harpers Ferry Raid (2012) at 31-2.
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no care for their well-being. They are treated like outsiders or animals, feel owned,
recount stories of exchange, purchase and sale and describe their transition into slavery
as one of becoming an object. For example, Lajeunesse was repeatedly told that she
‘was just an animal without any family’.40 Iliona recalls the transformation of women
into ‘senseless objects’.41 Battis emphasises his transformation from human to thing—a
‘product’: ‘The broker gave 1,000 rupees [$20] to my father and took me with him
as a product in his carry bag.’42 In our interview with Tung, he recounted the genital
mutilation he suffered as an attempt to ‘make him like a sex toy’.43
However, some also go beyond the definitional points of the past decade’s legal
debate to offer new layers of definition for slavery. Aged four, Jean-Robert Cadet was
‘given’ to a family as a restavec, a child domestic slave, after hismother died. For 10 years,
he served a number of families, being ‘treated like the lowest of the low’.44 He identifies
the ease with which restavec children are used and mistreated, but in particular reveals
the complete disregard for his well-being and the impact of social exclusion:
Any of you sitting here at this very moment can go to Haiti and ask for a child to
live with you. All you need to do is find a family with too many mouths to feed
and promise that you will send the child to school and she is yours. You can treat
her the same way slaves were treated under the French colonists. You do not
have to make her part of your family, learn her name, send her to school, provide
her with health care, buy her clothes, give her affection, or treat her like a human
being. You can make her sleep outside, torture her to death . . .
One of the worst forms of abuse facing Haiti’s slave children is exclusion. Slave
children set tables for meals in which they cannot partake, fetch water that they
cannot use for their own needs, are denied medical care when they are struck by
illness, are forbidden to speak until spoken to, and stay outside when adults are
inside. While these slave children are forced to be invisible, they must remain
within reach of their master’s voice. Otherwise, severe doses of physical
punishment will ensue without mercy . . .
This daily exclusion from any community or family often leaves no visible scars,
but their trauma lasts a lifetime . . . Since their most basic rights—to a family’s
love and protection, health care, and education—are denied, restavecs are
invisible children, observers instead of participants in their own society.45
Cadet had no physical security, was malnourished and his comfort, health and
educational needs were irrelevant. The inferiority of his status was further asserted
in the way he was demeaned: his ‘family’ showing a complete lack of regard for his
name and, by extension, his identity. He was ‘invisible’ and othered, an observer rather
40 Murphy (ed.), Survivors of Slavery: Modern-Day Slave Narratives (2014) at 63.
41 Bales and Trodd (eds), To Plead Our Own Cause: Personal Stories by Today’s Slaves (2008) at 126.
42 Ibid. at 79.
43 Tung, as told toAndreaNicholson, 9 February 2017 (on filewith authors).Our thanks to PalmCove Society
for their assistance.
44 Cadet,My Stone of Hope: FromHaitian Slave Child to Abolitionist (2011) at 25.
45 Bales and Trodd (eds), To Plead Our Own Cause: Personal Stories by Today’s Slaves (2008) at 201-2.
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than a participant in society, with no identity beyond that of a restavec, and ‘deprived
of himself ’ with no futurity. In Patterson’s words, he was ‘socially isolated’ and
‘parasitically degraded’. This exclusion and spectrality recurs in dozens of contemporary
slave narratives. Christine Stark describes herself as ‘silent’ and ‘numb’.46 Elena notes
that she was treated ‘as if I were a nothing’,47 andMendeNazer that ‘I was a non-person.
I didn’t really exist.’48
The idea of slavery as spectralisation, or non-existence, has full expression in our
interview with Dwain, a former child slave from Niger. His single mother suffered
severe mental illness, and he was immediately ‘adopted’ by relatives on birth. As soon
as he was old enough, he was used as a houseboy. He was not treated as a member
of the family, and was made to feel dirty, illegitimate, lesser and in his own words,
‘discarded’. Dwain was exploited, malnourished, humiliated, abused and trafficked to
work for relatives in France, Italy and the UK. Eventually, a neighbour witnessed his
mistreatment and alerted the authorities. Defining ‘slavery’, Dwain stated:
[Slavery is] removing someone’s autonomy. Their way of thinking, their
freedom to act out on their impulses, on their whim. In fear of challenging your
master I suppose; his commands or wishes. He doesn’t want you to be able to
express yourself or be opinionated or to say anything. You’re meant to be seen
and not heard. Which is exactly what I was. Its utilising your power but not to
your advantage; to theirs.
. . .
My strength has been built up for somebody else. ‘Cause as I say you don’t
usually get a weak slave, you know? He or she’s no good for you if, you know,
you want a strong one who can lift things, who’s durable, energy levels always
high and if anything, presentable to the eye. You don’t want one that you’ve
beaten up last week and it’s still there. You want one that can heal quickly
without any less performance rate if that makes sense. Because you’re almost
treated like a vehicle, like a car or something, well, a possession. You’re
somebody’s possession. So the word guardian or responsibility is far from
possession, it’s almost three different words, but they are actually possession. So
basically, whatever you think you want to do, you simply won’t be able to do it
unless it’s at the request of the master. So you’re a shadow of yourself basically.
There were so many times when I was in that regime, I’d look at myself outside
of myself, and think God I’d be cross with asking that boy to do that much, so
why aren’t they? And there’d be sometimes I’d just collapse through general
fatigue and crawl into my room, and one of the uncles would say: “What are you
doing?” And I would say sorry I’m just resting. “Well get up, my mum needs this,
he needs that, yeah, I know get up and do it.” Because as he’s asking me, it’s not
46 Ibid. at 101.
47 Murphy (ed.), supra n 35 at 109.
48 Nazer and Lewis, Slave: The True Story of a Girl’s Lost Childhood and Her Fight for Survival (2004) at 293.
See also Ward, ‘Servitude and Slave Narratives: Tracing “New Slaveries” in Mende Nazer’s Slave and
Zadie Smith’s “The Embassy of Cambodia”’ (2016) 31Wasafiri 42 at 45.
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really asking me it’s like, “Nahmate, you’re not resting yet. I’ve just come in and I
need to be tended to”, you know. And the amount of times you’d hear: “Well
what’s that boy doing?” or “Are you hungry? Well tell that boy to cook it”. And
you can hear, you know, whom they’re referring to, which is sad.
There’s no identity, you don’t really belong to anybody, but you’re someone’s
possession. If you belong to someone I’d like to think, like I’d treat my trainers
[running shoes]—if I had a new pair of trainers and I went out one day and it
was a muddy terrain, I’d come back and clean them. Because I love them and
they’re mine. But that never happened with me. Never. I almost thought I was a
disgusting thing anyway . . .
. . .
You’re lucky that every 24 hours that you’ve put under your belt you ain’t dead.
So that’s what I class slavery as. If you can get through a day without being
discharged, which means anything, then you’ve been alright. That’s what slavery
is . . . [M]ost definitely it’s just taking away your autonomy or your freedom to
do as you please. Your will, your free will. It’s not yours at all. And if it is, it’s only
at certain periods of time; when master’s asleep, or when master’s gone off to see
some other concubine or something like that . . .
. . .
[Y]ou see there’s nothing there that’s your choice and if I understand the word
exploitation in itself then that’s definitely not your choice either. And just for the
merit of the fact that your choice has been taken away from you would, would
class that to me as exploitation, or abuse, or lack of options, or whatever you
wanna call it. But then of course you’ve got slavery, which is exactly the same
thing.49
Dwain confirms the elements of a slavery definition onwhich there is consensus. But he
also goes beyond the exercise of power over him todiscuss slavery as the use of hispower.
By assuming that power for their own purpose, slaveholders diminished his ability to
have influence and authority, to create change and to be independent. Slavery denied
intentionality, his sense of agency and his ability to self-realise. He was ‘deprived’ of
himself—‘of his body, soul and spirit’: his strength became another’s strength.
Dwain’s descriptions of slavery as a state of lacking choice and being treated as a
possession underpin his statement that slavery is the destruction of identity. He had
no identity other than that of a slave, he did not belong to anyone in the sense that he is
unloved and uncared for and hemeant nothing to his ‘family’ other than as a possession
to be used. Earlier in his narrative, he refers to the slave as ‘it’—a thing, not a person—
and to himself as ‘that boy’. He is not loved, he is objectified as a ‘disgusting thing’ and
there is no regard for his physical or mental health. His expectation and acceptance of
his potential death, where he felt ‘lucky’ to get through the day without dying or being
‘discharged’ and knew that life can be ‘wrenched away’, underscores the denial of access
to temporality that recurs in both historical and contemporary slave narratives.
49 Dwain, interview with Andrea Nicholson, 3 November 2017 (on file with authors).
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Definitions of freedom can also reveal the characteristics of slavery. Survivor nar-
ratives indicate that understanding and defining slavery often requires understanding
slavery in relationship to freedom. There is little scholarship on the meaning of freedom
for survivors of slavery. But survivors’ experiences of freedom form one final route
towards a survivor-informed definition of slavery. Defining freedom, Dwain said:
D: In a simplistic way then [freedom is] just to be able to travel you know, er, if
you go to that travel agency and say can I get a flight to Tenerife please and the
following week I’m there. That would be freedom to me. I’ve been stuck in your
country for this long . . . [Dwain then discusses his struggles with the
regularisation of his immigration status and to gain a passport, as his birth was
not registered, nor does he have his parents’ birth certificates].
Interviewer: So really you’re identifying the ability to travel, which is linked to
them giving you a passport, as symbolic of a lot more.
D: Oh yes, it is . . . You’ve read it. It really is. It’s so symbolic that I would
probably keel over and cry in front of anybody because what that’s shown me is
finally what I’ve strived for forever, which is acceptance. I didn’t choose to be
this way it’s just what happened. What I’ve tried to do is live with the Achilles
heel that I have, if it is that. But because I’m living with it why can’t anybody just
respect that and work with me on it rather than against me or like . . . you know
people like me are treated like criminals.
How can I be a criminal? I didn’t choose this; I didn’t choose to come into a
country I didn’t even know I was coming into illegally. So, because of that, why
am I still being punished?
So it [freedom] would take a lot, it would windme probably, it would take all the
wind out of me but positively. Because then the new wind that would come
would be a positive energy, a more vibrant optimistic, looking forward to the
futures you know, because I feel like I can make a difference in my future now
rather than sleeping on it . . . . But I’m now limited to what I can do, if I don’t
sleep on it what do you want me to do? Scream on it? Because if I scream on it
I’ll get put inside some prison or mental institution. I’m trying to keep my sanity
so that when the good times do come I can actually recognise it as good times.50
Ultimately, for Dwain, freedom is not just the ability to travel, with the choice that
travel implies. The things that would enable travel, namely confirmation of citizenship
and a passport, mean something more profound to him: acceptance as a ‘legitimate’
person. To be acknowledged by society and to integrate with it fully is to gain approval
as a free human being. Slavery, then, is the converse of acceptance. It is the rejection
of his value to society and his own identity within it. Echoing the definitions by
nineteenth-century narrators, were Dwain to realise Douglass’ ‘full freedom,’ he would
50 Ibid.
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move beyond his current situation of stasis—‘only being’, ‘sleeping on it’—and have the
capacity to envisage and enact multiple futures.
In 2017, we also interviewed Tung, a young Vietnamese man who was trafficked,
exploited and enslaved in the UK. Like Dwain, Tung identified definitional nuances for
slavery that go beyond theBellagio-HarvardGuidelines and the suggestions of scholars.
And like Dwain, Tung’s definition includes attention to the meaning of freedom. At
the age of fifteen years, Tung believed he was being sent from his village to the UK to
reunite with his father. He was excited and happy, not knowing that his parents had
incurred considerable debt. He was brought to the UK via Russia and the French
migrant camps. On arrival, he was taken to work in a Chinese takeaway. He was made
to work up to 19 hours a day without breaks or pay, sleeping on the floor of a small
storage room behind the kitchen with several others. He was allowed out once a week,
accompanied, tobuybasicprovisions.Over aperiodof six years, hewas traffickedwithin
the UK and forced to manage cannabis farms. Eventually, he was forced into sexual
slavery, suffering genital mutilation and severe impacts on his health. Discussing the
meaning of slavery and freedom, Tung explained:
Right now I do think that I am like a slave, I was a slave. However I didn’t think
so up to the point where I got into the detention centre. I just thought what I had
to do, I had to go through it, because my mum and dad owed the big debt and I
thought I had to work to pay off the debt. I didn’t know about the definition of
slavery or the word slave. It was only brought to me on the first interview by
somebody from the Home Office. The lady who came and asked me lots of
questions, after I answered the questions she stopped the interview and she
explained to me that I may be the victim of human traffickers and what I had to
go through was like human slavery. So that lady helped me to fill in the forms for
asylum, and it was then I was more aware of what I had been through . . .
To me, slave probably means being someone that had to do something that they
are made to do without knowing the purpose of the action or being someone
who had to do something under some kind of threat, or doing something
without being paid or for any kind of reward for that . . .
Freedom is not being arrested, not being kept in any way. Freedom to me is
being allowed to do what I want to do or I am allowed to have human rights,
basic human rights, like being able to go to school, and freedom to me means I
have got a private life, I can do what I want as long as it isn’t illegal and I can do
what I want without being watched.51
The first definitional marker for slavery in Tung’s narrative is life without purpose.
The slave experiences a disconnection between choice and action, for actions are at
the will of the slaveholder and have no purpose or meaning to the enslaved. He is
aimless and motiveless. The second measure of slavery for Tung revolves around his
understanding of freedom. Freedommeans a private life—a lifewithout beingwatched.
51 Tung, supra n 38.
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Conversely, slavery is a denial of privacy. Like the idea of action without meaningful
purpose, the denial of a right to privacy suggests a level of control: the denial of agency
within one’s own life. To the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines’ illustrations of ‘control
over a person by another such as a person might control a thing’—the withholding
of identity documents, the restriction of free movement and attempts to forge a new
identity through force—Tung adds the denial of privacy and the severing of a clear
connection between purpose and action.
5. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SURVIVOR-INFORMED DEFINITION
OF SLAVERY
Writing in 2014, one of this article’s co-authors, Dang, noted the limitations of current
slavery definitions:
As a survivor of human trafficking and slavery, I ammost concerned that the way
we think about the problem will be in the best interest of the victims and
survivors. Currently, I don’t think this is the case . . . . There is currently no
victim-centred definition of human trafficking or slavery. The definitions fail to
sufficiently describe the condition of the person experiencing the criminal
act(s) done to them . . . . Human trafficking and slavery are fundamentally
problems because they cause harm. Thus, the definition needs to convey the
social and interpersonal impact.
Dang then offered this victim-centred definition:
Slavery is a social phenomenon existing on the far end of a continuum of
oppression, where human beings completely dominate and exploit other human
beings and this domination results in physical, psychological, and interpersonal
trauma; financial and social instability and inequities; and dilution of the
fundamental principles of democracy.52
Dang’s survivor-informed definition points to the importance of defining slavery
through attention to its impact or harm. So too do the contemporary narratives we have
gathered and analysed. The slavery definitions in these survivor narratives validate the
emerging consensus in recent scholarly debates on definition, including a lack of social
acceptance, where the enslaved exist beyond society’s structures and systems. But they
also reveal at least five new criteria for the operation of a slavery definition: (1) stasis,
the denial of temporal and spatial movement so that the enslaved experience a lack of
access to the future; (2) spectralisation or destruction of identity, due to objectification,
dehumanisation and othering; (3) lack of purpose, where actions lose their meaning;
(4) denial of privacy, with the corresponding loss of agency and dignity; and (5) a
disregard for well-being. What ties all these definitional layers together is their shared
52 Dang, ‘LanguageMatters: DefiningHumanTrafficking and Slavery’ End Slavery Now, Blog, 2October 2014,
available at: endslaverynow.org/blog/articles/language-matters-defining-human-trafficking-and-slavery
[last accessed 11 September 2018].
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starting-point: slavery’s consequences, rather than the slaveholder’s intent. Current
definitions of slavery emphasise the function or purpose of control for slaveholders and
are therefore primarily framed from the perspective of the perpetrator. This means that
government bodies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) currently organise
antislavery efforts around aperpetrator-centreddefinition. Survivors instead emphasise
the impact of control.
These five definitional layers, and their invitation to understand slavery’s meaning
and nature from the survivor perspective of slavery’s impact rather than its intent, have
implications for a key area of antislavery policy: post-slavery support. Current legal
definitions provide guidelines for law enforcement to detect slavery and respond to
it as a crime. Interventions are aimed at criminal justice rather than social justice and
survivor restoration. But Tung, for example, was almost dismissive about the fact that
his traffickers had not been caught and prosecuted. Throughout the interview, this
was not his concern or an expressed need in terms of his view of justice. Instead,
Tung’s perception of justice revolved around the post-enslavement support available
to him (housing, food, dignity, asylum and legal representation). He also spoke of the
shame and fear that he experienced until he was able to compare his experiences with
others held in a detention centre. Those feelings diminished when he told his story,
he explained. This perception of justice as rooted outside of the legal system—in
support that involves a context for telling one’s story—recurs across several contem-
porary narratives. Tung’s narrative and the stories of others are a call for therapeutic
justice: a justice model where legal processes act as social agents geared to enhancing
psychological well-being.53
At the same time, our interviews and analysis reveal thatwhilemany survivors donot
see prosecution as central to their own sense of justice, they do nonetheless care deeply
about how their experiences are assessed and labelled by courts. A court statement that
slavery occurred can create feelings of shame but can also be validating as a formal
acknowledgement of their mistreatment and their entitlement to rights. The definition
validates that an experience has been harmful. It means they are no longer spectralised,
but present in the world and its systems, and it asks the State to take responsibility.
It also opens access to a survivor community where experiences, choices and actions
have a shared context. In fact, survivors’ expressed need in their narratives to label
their experiences as slavery suggests that our ability to agree and apply a survivor-
informed slavery definition would have a therapeutic benefit.54 A survivor-informed
slavery definition would encompass the psychological impact of enslavement, allowing
legal definitions to delineate that harm and encouraging service-providers to focus on
what survivors themselves suggest in their narratives should be the key post-enslavement
53 SeeWexler andWinick, Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic Jurisprudence (1996).
54 We have also documented significant survivor frustration with other individuals who identify their
experience as slavery but whose experiences fall outside of the slavery definition of ‘powers attaching to
the right of ownership’ (instead embodying ‘practices similar to slavery’). Survivors explain they have felt
insulted when individuals use the word ‘slavery’ to label circumstances and harm that appear ‘less’ than
slavery. A survivor-informed slavery definition does not therefore mean an all-encompassing definition that
collapses the distinction between slavery and ‘practices similar to slavery’ (or what the Bellagio-Harvard
Guidelines term ‘lesser servitudes’).
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concerns: enabling survivors to get on with their lives, adjust to freedom and—in some
cases—supporting their work as survivor-leaders to prevent the enslavement of others.
In fact, the definitions of survivors contain a potential blueprint for that recovery
process, because in defining slavery through its consequences, they suggest that free-
dom has the inverse effect. For example, if Tung’s definition of slavery is loss of purpose
and his definition of freedom includes a right to a private life, then a ‘full freedom’—
in Douglass’ words—would enable the survivor to achieve purpose and privacy after
enslavement. Other survivor narratives describe slavery’s impact as feelings of shame, a
loss of a sense of common humanity and a sense of stunted growth. Trauma recovery
could therefore focus onprocesses of accepting victimhood and innocence (in response
to shame), building community (in response to a loss of a sense of common humanity)
and developing a new identity and purpose that incorporates the experiences of slavery
(in response to a sense of stunted growth). As we have learned from survivor narratives,
freedom and slavery must be understood in relationship to each other. Work by and
with survivors to reclaim their identity may therefore need to avoid denying or com-
partmentalising the experiences of slavery.
By taking a survivor-informed approach to defining slavery, we may even be able to
map survivor definitions of slavery—and their blueprint for recovery—onto mental
health concepts of well-being. Ryff outlines the six dimensions of well-being as self-
acceptance, personal growth, autonomy, purpose in life, positive relationships and
environmental mastery.55 Our analysis of narratives suggests that these six dimensions
are recurring themes: their loss is a consequence of slavery, and their restoration is
a focus for survivors after enslavement. Well-being is likely to be a key element of
survivors’ experiences of freedom, just as denial of well-being is a survivor-informed
slavery definitional layer. By delineating how survivors define well-being in freedom,
we can answer the inverse question of which slavery experiences have the most impact
on a survivor’s well-being.
In so doing, we can better identify not only the central indicators of what the
Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines term ‘control over a person by another such as a per-
son might control a thing’ but also a blueprint for survivor recovery. In 2015, the
international community committed to trying to end slavery by 2030, as part of the
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 8.7).56 By putting survivor
perspectives, definitional ideas and policy suggestions at the centre of their work, the
thousands of contemporary organisations working to end global slavery could create
a survivor-informed antislavery movement—one that understands slavery through its
impact not its intent, and so target the liberation of 40 million people towards, at last,
Douglass’ ‘full freedom’.
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